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2 
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS OF 
VISUAL LITERACY 
. Paul Messaris 
In one of the foundational texts of visual scholarship, Studies in Jconology, 
distinguished art historian Erwin Panofsky (1939) provides what is proba­
bly the most complete account co dace of how many different layers of 
meaning can be present in a single picture. In the process of parsing the 
historical roots and culcural resonances of such traditional images as 
father time or the winged cupid, Panofsky gives a stunning demonstration 
of the amount of erudition that is entailed in an informed reading of pie· 
cures that may, on the surface, appear quite simple. Anyone who has read 
Panofsky's book will have come away with a renewed appreciation for 
the complexity of this form of erudition, which fairly may be labeled visu·
al literacy. Yet Panofsky himself raises the issue of another kind of visual 
interpretation whose dependence on prior literacy is by no means as 
clear. As Panofsky indicates, we can make a distinction between two dif­
ferent aspects of pictorial interpretation: on the one hand, understanding 
an image's cultural significance: on the other hand, perceiving the 
image's physical contents-the people. places, and events depicted in it. 
It is self-evidently true that the former aspect of interpretation requires 
visual literacy. But what about the latter? As a prelude to �nswering this 
question, let us examine an act of spectatorship that is far removed from 
the urban European context in which Panofsky was writing. 
In a magazine article with major implications not only for visual com­
munication but also for verbal language, reporter John Colapinto describes 
a visit to the rain forest of northwestern Brazil, where he spent some time 
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with members of an Amazonian tribe called the Piraha. consisting of 
approximately 350 people. Colapinto was accompanying a U.S. linguistics 
professor. John Everett, who has been studying the Piraha for some 30 
years and is one of very few outsiders with any substantial knowledge of 
their language and culture. The language of the Piraha is a subject of 
major controversy in the linguistic community because its structure is so 
different from that of any other known language as to call into question 
certain fundamental assumptions about human linguistic universals. In 
particular, Everett observes that Piraha grammar confines its speakers to 
the discussion of nonabstract entities within their immediate experience. 
and therefore lacks such things as numbers (or even the concept of count­
ing). color terms, embedded clauses. and relative tenses. Moreover. 
Piraha culture is notable for "the absence of creation myths and fiction. 
the absence of any individual or collective memory of more than two gen­
erations past, the absence of drawing or other art" (Everett. 2005. p. 621 ). 
A couple of days into his visit, Colapinto's impression of the Piraha was 
one of unbridgeable cultural remoteness. 
Then one evening. Colapinto attended a film screening that Everett 
had arranged for an audience of about 30 Piraha with the aid of a genera­
tor-powered DVD player. The movie was the 2005 Peter Jackson version 
of King Kong. and the viewers· reactions were enthusiastic. "The Piraha 
shouted with delight, fear, laughter. and surprise-and when Kong him­
self arrived, smashing through the palm trees. pandemonium ensued" 
(Colapinto. 2007, p. 136). Moreover, the Piraha's comments also made it 
clear that they fully understood the implications of the less action-oriented 
scenes in which -King Kong interacts with the character played by actress 
Naomi Wans. Despite the fact that these scenes involve radical disrup­
tions of the continuity. of space and perspective as the camera cuts back 
and forth between huge close-ups of the two protagonists, the Piraha 
appeared to have no trouble interpreting the scenes· implied sexual 
undercurrents. The ease with which the Piraha viewers interpreted this 
particular movie becomes even more remarkable when one takes into 
account the fact that their prior exposure to cinema had been confined 
entirely to Everett's personal collection. Their environment contains no 
movie theaters. no television, no Web access. and, indeed. no regular 
supply of electricity. As Colapinto (2007) concludes. in contrast to 
research findings on Piraha language and cognition, "Jackson's movie left 
no question about the universality of Hollywood film grammar" (pp. l 36-
137). Indeed, Everett (2005) pointedly observed that. despite more than 
200 years of regular contact with neighboring Brazilian peoples. the 
Piraha do not speak any verbal language other than their own. 
This story is a vivid illustration of just how different pictures are from 
verbal language. People who study visual communication customarily talk 
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abouc che need for visual literacy. As a convenient label for pictorial com­
pecence {ability to create images, interpret them adequately. discern their 
consequences, resist their effects). the term is certainly useful, and. in any 
case, there is no readily available substitute. However. if the term carries 
with it the implication that pictorial fluency works in the same way as ver­
bal fluency does, its use is substantially misleading. It leads to the 
assumption that the interpretation of pictures depends on prior familiarity 
with a set of formal conventions, whereas one of the esser,tial characteris­
cics of piccorial communication is precisely the fact that it can take place 
even when those conventions are unfamiliar or are encountered for the 
first time. as in the case of the Piraha. A popular textbook on visual com­
munication makes the following claim: "There are certain codes or con­
ventions of [movie] editing that we all learn from experience, from watch­
ing numerous motion pictures .... All of these devices are analogous to 
punctuation in writing .... Someone unfamiliar with these editing conven­
tions. is likely to misinterpret the film" (Berger, 2008, p. 15 I). It is 
because of this kind of overstated analogy between pictures and language 
that the term visual literacy needs to be treated with caution, if not dis­
carded altogether. To put this differently: Meyrowitz ( 1998) argues that lit­
eracy in any medium entails three types of knowledge, having to do with 
the medium's contents, its fixed characteristics, and the production vari­
ables that are employed by its users. Meyrowitz calls this third type of 
knowledge "media grammar literacy." Using his terminology, we can say 
that a distinguishing feature of visual media is that they are the one form 
of communication whose competent interpretation does not depend on 
media grammar literacy. 
If the role of literacy (i.e., prior familiarity with conventions) is not as 
pivotal in pictorial interpretation as it is in linguistic comprehension, then 
it must be the case that, for some visual conventions at least, certain gen­
eral cognitive processes (i.e .• mental operations whose application 
extends beyond the range of pictures and that a viewer ·could be expected 
co develop even before his/her first encounter with pictorial media) pro­
vide an adequate basis for interpretation. My goal in this chapter is to 
spell out what these cognitive processes might be. Specifically. I discuss 
the following four types, which I consider to be central components of a 
competent viewer's repertory: (a) the brain's processing of visual informa­
tion in a modular fashion; (b) analogical thinking-the ability to perceive a 
formal analogy between a visual device and some aspec;c of everyday 
experience; (c) spatial intelligence-the derivation of a coherent sense of 
a three-dimensional scene out of a limited number of partial views of that 
scene; and (d) the use of contextual information in the interpretation of 
nonverbal behavior. In discussing these cognitive processes. I develop a 
theoretical account of visual interpretation that differs from the more tra-
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ditional, visual literacy approach. This is not to say that the cwo approach­
es are totally incompatible. In fact, I describe ways in which they might 
complement each ocher. However, to the extent that the approach I sug­
gest offers a valid interpretation of the viewing process. one of the main 
implications of the visual literacy approach-the idea that pictorial com­
prehension requires prior exposure to images-needs to be rethought. 
MODULAR PROCESSING OF VISUAL INFORMATION 
A major impetus behind the early development of the visual literacy idea 
was the work of art historian E.H. Gombrich (2004)-in particular. his 
book on Art and Illusion, whose first edition was published in I 960. 
Arguing against the "commonsensical" view chat pictorial comprehension 
is based on simple similarity between pictures and the things they repre­
sent, Gombrich pointed out that there are numerous ways in which even 
the most "realistic" picture differs from the appearance of the real world. 
For example, in the real world, obJects have three dimensions. whereas. 
on a picture surface, the world is flat. Moreover. many kinds of pictures 
that we may accept unthinkingly as adequate representations of reality 
are actually quite radical departures from it. A black-and-white movie 
exhibits many of the attributes of "photographic realism 
.
. -but it lacks 
color. A technical blueprint is a mathematically accurate representation of 
spatial relationships-but it lacks shading as well as color. A cartoon crea­
ture may be beguilingly real to audiences of all ages-but it lacks accurate 
proportions. Gombrich's writings contain many such examples of sharp 
discrepancies between the world of visual images and the world of three­
dimensional, naturally proportioned, physically illuminated reality In the 
face of such discrepancies, the concept of visual literacy may seem to 
offer a self-evidently true account of how people come to comprehend 
images: They have to learn the conventions, because so many of the con­
ventions are "unrealistic." 
Gombrich's influence. on the thinking of subsequent generations or 
visual scholars has been long lasting, and, as we have seen. the visual lit­
eracy idea is still present in textbooks on visual communication. 
However, much of the empirical evidence on picture perception is at odds 
with this idea. Several cross-cultural studies (see Messaris. I 994. for a 
review), as well as some research with animals (Fagot. 200 I). and even a 
study of blind people's interpretations of raised outline drawings 
(Kennedy. 1993) have found that a variety of pictures that may intuitively 
appear "unrealistic" are actually understood without much difficulty by 
untutored viewers. Perhaps the most noteworthy single study in this area 
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is a classic, one-of-a-kind experiment by Hochberg and Brooks ( 1962), 
husband-and-wife scholars who raised their own child without any expo­
sure to pictures and then tested his picture-perception abilities when he 
was old enough to be able to talk (see also Peterson, Gilliam,&. Hedgwick, 
2006). The experiment contained not only black-and-white photographs 
but also unshaded outline drawings (i.e., two styles of pictures that both 
contain significant deviations from the appearance of unmediated reality). 
And yet, the child in chis experiment was able to give co�rect identifica­
tions of the contents of almost all of the pictures he was shown. 
What cognitive process(es) could account for such findings? One pos­
sible way to explain them comes from the theory of modularity of visual 
perception (see Calabretta &. Parisi, 2005; Viviani &. Aymoz, 200 I; Zecki, 
2005). According to chis theory, our perceptual system encompasses a 
variety of distinct processes or "modules" that interpret the various com­
ponents of a visual scene-shapes. movements, color:;;, and so on-sepa­
rately from one another. In other words, the cognitive process that deter­
mines what shapes we are looking at functions separately from the cogni­
tive process that detects and interprets the nature of movement, and so 
forth. The crucial point here is that, in theory, the operations of certain 
modules are independent of the operations of other modules. In principle, 
we might be able to tell what types of movements we were witnessing 
even if for some reason we weren't able to say what types of objects were 
performing those movements. Paradoxical although this supposition may 
seem, it has actually received considerable substantiation from studies of 
patients with pinpoint brain damage that affects one or more of the per­
ceptual "modules" while leaving the others intact. One of the most dra­
matic examples of this kind of thing was described by neurologist Oliver 
Sacks (1998) in his widely publicized study, "The Man Who Mistook His 
Wife for a Hae." The patient in this case had a brain malfunction that 
robbed him of the ability co identify objects, but he was still perfectly able 
to describe their shape, size. movement, and so on. 
How does the theory of modularity of vision apply to picture percep­
tion? Perhaps the simplest example of its implications ls the problem of 
pictorial depth perception. Except for so-called "3D" images that are 
viewed with special glasses. all pictures (including movies) lack a crucial 
item of information about distance or "depth"-namely, binocular dispari­
ty, the difference between what the left eye sees and what the right eye
sees. This difference is an extremely powerful depth cue, especially for 
objects that are close to us. If vision functioned "wholistically" and every­
thing had to be in place simultaneously for us to be able to make sense of 
our visual impressions. the fact that pictures lack binocular disparity 
would be an insurmountable obstacle for first-time viewers of pictures, 
who would need to learn how to interpret pictures in its absence (i.e., 
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they would have to acquire visual literacy). However. according co the 
assumptions of the modular theory, lack of binocular disparity should noc 
prevent inexperienced viewers from interpreting pictures if other types of 
visual information are present in the picture and are capable of sustaining 
an adequate interpretation. In che specific case of depth perception. there 
is at least one other very powerful depth cue (viz. motion parallax) that is 
always present in motion pictures, and that should provide a sufficient 
sense of depth in and of itself. When King Kong comes crashing through 
the jungle. it is mainly motion parallax chat tells us he is getting closer, 
and even inexperienced viewers should be able to make that inference­
as indeed happened with the Piraha audience described by Colapinto. 
Modularity of vision also is almost certainly a major factor in our abili­
ty to make sense of black-and-white photographs. as well as other types 
of images that lack naturalistic color. There is considerable evidence that 
color perception is largely localized in certain specific areas of the brain, 
and there is also evidence that when these areas malfunction and the 
color "module" cease co operate normally, che ocher aspects of vision are 
able to proceed without significant impediment. A real-world example of 
chis kind of situation has been described by Sacks in another of his well­
known case studies. "The Painter Who Became Color Blind" (Sacks & 
Wasserman, 1987), about an artist who lose his ability to see color as a 
result of an accident buc was still able to make sense of all ocher features 
of the visual field (depth. motion. object identity, ecc.). By extension. ic 
should not surprise us thac the young child studied by Hochberg and 
Brooks was able co make sense of black-and-white photographs che very 
first time he encountered chem. The child's ease of interpretation of out­
line drawings is also partly explainable on the basis of the modularity of 
color vision, but a full explanation of thac aspect of Hochberg' s and 
Brook's findings (as well as similar findings in studies of animals) is some­
what more complicated and would take us beyond che scope of this chap­
ter. Suffice it to say chat there is good reason to believe that our brain's 
processing of real-world visual information entails the extraction of "out­
lines" of the objects in our visual field. and that this process most likely 
provides pan of the "module" that is responsible for our ability co make 
sense of sketches. stick figures, and ocher kinds of incomplete pictorial 
representations (Marr, 1983). The more fundamental point in all of this is 
chat, if che modular cheory is even partly correct, it furnishes an explana­
tion of pictorial perception that does not depend on prior familiarity wich 
pictures. In other words, according to this theory. we are able to make 
sense of pictures because they elicit cognitive mechanisms that we 
already use in everyday visual perception-even if we have never seen a 
picture before and are therefore totally "illiterate" m that respect. 
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ANALOGICAL THINKING 
One of the clearest examples of a formal convention that is encountered 
very widely both in still and in moving pictures is the use of a low or a 
high camera angle as a means of making someone look powerful or pow­
erless. I would assume that even someone with no formal background in 
visual scholarship would readily recognize this convention because it is, 
as indicated, in very wide use. However, for our purposes the important 
question is this: How does the viewer come to understand this conven­
tion when he or she sees it in a print ad or film or TV program? What 
previous knowledge must the viewer have in order to be able to respond 
to this use of camera angle in the appropriate ·manner (as called for by 
the convention)? The visual literacy response to this question would be 
that the viewer would have to have had a number of previous encounters 
with this use of camera angle, in the course of which she or he would 
gradually have acquired a sense of this device's meaning. For example, 
we may imagine a child gradually coming to associate low angles with 
shots of villains in threatening postures and thereafter responding to the 
angle itself in the appropriate way. This certainly seems like a plausible 
possibility. and, more than likely. it does indeed happen to a certain 
extent. 
At the same time, however. it seems to me that there is an alternative 
route to the interpretation of this kind of use of camera angle-and, if I 
am correct, this alternative route would not require any previous expo­
sure to this specific device. This alternative route is based on the fact that 
the camera-angle convention is not an arbitrary convention (in other 
words. it's not like the word "powerful," whose form is unrelated to the 
concept it denotes); instead. I would argue that the particular use of cam­
era angle which we've been examining derives its m�aning by analogy 
with real-life situations of looking up at powerful people or looking down 
at weak people-a realm of experience that is likely to be particularly rel­
evant to the formative years of childhood. If this assumption is correct, its 
implication is that a viewer should be able to respond appropriately to 
camera angle on the basis of the analogy with real-life experience, with­
out any necessary previous exposure to the use of camera angle in pictori­
al media. In other words. here we have another example of a pictorial ele­
ment that may be interpretable on the basis of a general cognitive 
process, namely, sensitivity to visual analogy-or, perhaps. even more 
generally, analogical thinking. This alternative possibility does not pre­
clude the visual literacy approach, and, in fact, it seems quite possible 
that general sensitivity to visual analogy may develop from the specific 
experience of camera angle and other similar pictorial conventions. 
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Nonetheless, as interpretational mechanisms, these two alternatives are 
certainly distinct. 
Although camera angle may be one of the clearest examples of a 
device that draws on analogy for its meaning, in my view it is certainly nm 
the only one. Indeed, I argue that the use of analogical constructions is one 
of the distinctive features of still and moving images as modes of commu­
nication. Let me list. very briefly, some other formal conventions whose 
meaning appears to derive from analogy with some aspect of real-life 
experience. At a bare minimum, such a list would include the following: 
I. Camera-to-subject distance (i.e .. the use of close-up vs. medi·
um shot, ecc.) as a means of emphasis or as a means of gener­
ating intimacy and identification with a character on che
screen (as Reeves &. Nass, 2003, have argued in an extended
analysis of this variable, it appears to derive its meaning and
effectiveness from an analogy to the real-life area of proxemic
behavior).
2. The use of camera movement to simulate a character's subjec­
tive visual experience in point-of-view shots (Farrar. Krcmar. &
Nowak, 2006)-for example, the "stealthy" camera movement
that tells us we are looking through the eyes of the serial killer
in a slasher movie; and
3. Speed of editing as a means of modulating the emotional tone
of a scene-for example, the use of rapid cutting co make
action scenes more exciting. or the use of slow-paced editing
to made romantic scenes more languorous.
SPATIAL INTELLIGENCE 
As the list just presented indicates. the scope for analogical thinking m thE' 
interpretation of visual media appears to be quite extensive. However. in 
my view, the cognitive pro_cess which is of greatest importance to film or 
TV editing, in particular, is not analogical thinking but, rather. spatial 
intelligence. As conceived of by cognitive psychologists (e.g .. see Gardner. 
1999), spatial intelligence comprises a cluster of related cognitive abilities. 
of which the most crucial for our purposes is the ability co derive a coher­
ent sense of a three-dimensional scene out of a limited number of panial 
views of that scene. Anyone familiar with cognitive psychology will recog­
_nize here an area of intelligence that is typically tapped through such 
measures as Piaget's three-mountain task: A child is shown a certain view 
of a mountainous landscape and asked to indicate how the mountains 
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would appear from a different viewing position. Although I do not think 
that this specific situation has an exact parallel in film or TV interpreta· 
tion. the general mental process of spatial integration on the basis of par­
tial views is brought into play every time the action in a scene is "inter­
rupted" by a cut from one point of view co another. Of course, such tran• 
sitions need not be extreme. Often. all that is involved is a small reorien­
tation of the camera back and forth between two people having a conver· 
sation. On the other hand, when it comes to action sequences, or such 
things as a switch from an "objective" view to a "subjective" shot (i.e .. the 
point of view of a character in the scene itself) the change in point of view 
can be quite radical-and, presumably, quite demanding with regard to 
the viewer's spatial intelligence. 
As I have indicated. I think that spatial intelligence may be the most 
important component of a competent viewer's repertory of cogniuve 
processes for interpreting editing. This judgment is based on an analysis 
of the kinds of editing that a viewer is likely to encounter in typical fic­
tional TV programs. In an unpublished study, my students and I exam· 
ined a convenience sample of nine U.S. TV programs: three daytime soap 
operas, three sitcoms, and three crime dramas. Our analysis was con­
cerned with the editing. We looked at each shot transition (cut, fade· 
out/fade-in, dissolve. etc.) and classified them into five overall categories, 
of which the only one that is relevant for our purposes was the first: a 
transition within a single location, from one point of view co another. 
Overall, an average of 95 % of the· transitions fell into this category. 
(Average N for cocal transitions, 559 per soap opera; 250 per sitcom; 398 
per crime drama.) In other words, by an overwhelming majority, the kind 
of editing transition that a viewer is likely co be confronted with in a typi· 
cal fictional TV program (at least in the United States) is precisely the kind 
of transition for which spatial intelligence is the relevant interpretational 
process. All the other editing devices-time-space changes, flashbacks, 
and so on. which sometimes seem to gee the lion's share of attention 
from scholars-are in fact a tiny minority of the whole. 
The relevance of spatial intelligence to film or TV viewing has 
received considerable attention from cognitive psychologists, and there 
are several studies suggesting or demonstrating a link between TV experi­
ence and performance on Piagetian or other tests of this cognitive process 
(most importantly, Tidhar, 1984). A review of this research is beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but the general finding-namely, that TV viewing 
can influence spatial intelligence-suggests a two-sided conclusion co 
what has been said so far: On the one hand, the major thrust of this pre­
sentation has been co argue that, when certain cognitive abilities precede 
visual-media experience, they can provide an avenue co interpretation in 
the absence of specific familiarity with the formal conventions of these 
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media. On the other hand, to the extent that spatial intelligence-and per­
haps other cognitive processes-are developed further through the view­
ing experience itself, we could say that competence in film or TV interpre­
tation is actually a form of more general intelligence. 
USE OF CONTEXTUAL CUES 
IN NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION 
The creation of a coherent space-time continuum out of the fragments 
presented in a film or TV program is one of the central intellectual casks 
that visual media demand of their viewers. However, the point of editing 
is not always that of linking time frames and points of view. A second 
major purpose-especially in dramatic contexts-is that of revealing char­
acters· thoughts. Intentions. and personalities. In his description of the 
Piraha audience's reactions to King Kong, Colapinto (2007) makes a point 
of the fact that their verbal commentary contained explications of "what 
was being communicated in the long, lingering looks that passes between 
gorilla and girl" (p. 137). The use of editing to imply thoughts and feelings 
was one of the earliest discoveries in the history of explicit theorizing 
about the movies. Its formulation is usually associated with Lev Kuleshov 
and ocher filmmakers working during the early years of Soviet cinema. In 
its best-known incarnation, the so-called "Kuleshov effect" is illustrated in 
Kuleshov's experiment involving an "expressionless" close-up of the 
Russian actor Mozhukhin juxtaposed with a variety of other scenes, 
including a plate of soup on a table. a corpse in a coffin, and a little girl 
playing with a toy bear. According to Kuleshov's colleague V.I. Pudovkin 
(1976), to whom we owe the best-known description of this experiment, 
viewers who saw these sequences without having been told about the 
editing responded with enthusiastic praise for Mozhukhin's acting. In 
other words, the editing led these viewers to see subtle changes of expres­
sion-from choughts of food to deep sorrow to a "light, happy smile"­
where in fact there were none (p. 168). 
The general category of juxtaposition explored in this experiment (and 
others that followed it) is a firmly established feature of film and TV edit­
ing. occurring most commonly, perhaps. in the conventional "reaction­
shot" sequence, in which shots of a speaker or other objects of interest are 
intercut with shots of a listener or observer. Such sequences are a typical 
ingredient of dialogue scenes in fiction films, as well as of "nonfictional" 
dialogues in talk shows or other TV programs, but the potential role of 
image juxtaposition as an indicator of characters' thoughts or reactions is 
probably most evident in the absence of dialogue and in those "nonfiction-
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al" cases in which a certain sequence of events is rearranged through edit­
ing (as in the many instances in which an interviewer's "reactions" are 
inserted into a TV interview after the fact). Assuming, as the evidence sug­
gests, that viewers typically do use the juxtaposition of images-rather 
than just the facial expressions in them-as clues to what lies "beneath the 
surface" of characters' faces, we are confronted with another cluster of 
visual conventions based on a single gen·eral principle. What might 
account for viewers· ability to make sense of these conventions? 
One possibility, as always, is that entailed in the notion of visual liter­
acy, namely, previous experience with the conventions in question. On 
the other hand, chis is an area in which a ready parallel with a set of real­
life cognitive processes suggests itself. Although the precise visual 
sequences that the viewer is confronted with on the screen-a view of a 
character juxtaposed with a view of some object or situation of interest to 
chat character-may not have an exact parallel in reality, the basic infer­
ential task that the viewer has to perform in the case of the film or TV 
sequence is similar to an extremely common real-life task, namely, that 
of judging ocher people's intentions from the context of their behavior. 
The degree to which this process is central to interpersonal communica­
tion bears some emphasis. As researchers in the area of nonverbal com­
munication and of person perception have noted, people's appearance. 
expressions, and actions are frequently ambiguous, or even completely 
opaque, in the absence of information about the objects or situations to 
which they are addressed. Indeed, a classic theoretical treatise by 
Birdwhistell ( 1970) has advanced the argument that no facial expression 
or gesture has a determinate meaning out of context. The ability to take 
context into account in inferring thoughts and assessing intentions is con­
sequently a vital component of any mature person's social skills. It is con­
ceivable that this ability-rather than any direct experience with editing 
conventions-may serve as the basis of the interpretational competence 
called for by the kinds of editing we are concerned with liere. 
This notion-chat the "Kuleshov effect" and related cinematic devices 
are derivatives of the real-life dependence of meaning on context-is con­
sistent with the implications of another, less widely known, experiment 
by the Russian filmmaker. In this experiment, Kuleshov filmed an actor in 
two roles: first, in a jail cell, as a famished prisoner being offered a bowl 
of soup; second, as a prisoner released from jail and taken out into the 
open air. The actor was invited to use every means at h\s disposal to 
express the sentiments appropriate to these two situations: on the one 
hand, craving for the soup; on the other hand, delight at the sight of birds, 
clouds. the sun. Then Kuleshov ( 197 4) produced various versions of the 
two scenes. in some of which the shots of the actor were transposed from 
one scene to the other. By his own account, regardless of how the scenes 
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were scrambled, viewers were unable to detect any discrepancy in the 
actor's performance. 
In other words, despite the face that the actor had a clear and distinct 
sentiment in mind in each case. his facial expressions in themselves were 
apparently incapable of conveying a specific enough sense of his 
thoughts, and the viewers' ultimate interpretations were evidently fixed 
by the overall context. This is essentially the point that investigators of 
real-life social perception have made about the information available in 
facial expressions and other overt indicators of thought and intention. 
Unlike the more famous Kuleshov experiment mentioned earlier, whose 
use of an unvarying, neutral expression might be seen as somewhat artifi­
cial. this one is based on a closer approximation of real-life conditions. in 
the sense that the actor's performance was allowed to vary with the situa­
tion. and it therefore makes the potential relationship between real life 
and this aspect of movie viewing clearer. 
CONCLUSION 
As this discussion suggests, then, both real-life experience and exposure 
to visual media are potential avenues to the interpretation of the kinds of 
visual devices we have been considering. One possibility does not neces­
sarily exclude the other, of course. It is conceivable that these two sources 
of interpretational competence might work together. either by reinforcing 
each other or by interacting in a more complex fashion. For example. pre­
vious exposure to editing might teach a viewer which juxtapositions of 
images to look at for psychological implications, while real-life social 
experiences might guide the actual inferences drawn from those juxtapo­
sitions. In the absence of research aimed explicitly at disencangling these 
possibilities-for example, a study of "naive" adult viewers· susceptibility 
to the Kuleshov effect-it is unclear that one can be more specific about 
either the necessary preconditions of these aspects of visual interpretation 
or the typical mix of experiences leading to them. However. what we can 
say is that, to the extent that the connections that have been drawn here 
between general (real-life) cognitive processes and visual conventions are 
valid. the interpretation of these conventions should be accessible even to 
an inexperienced, first-time viewer. In short. the assumption that inter­
pretation requires visual literacy may be wrong. 
If these beliefs about visual literacy are indeed mistaken, they can be 
said co have done a considerable disservice to visual scholarship. They 
have obscured one of the most distinctive and consequential attributes of 
images as a mode of communication-namely, the fact that images. 
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unlike words, engage our eyes and brains in the same way that the real 
word engages them. As we have seen, even when images are superficially 
"unrealistic" (black-and-white photographs, sketches, etc.). they are still 
capable of evoking the mental processes that we use in our transactions 
with raw, unmed1ated reality. This feature of images gives them a kind of 
power that words can never have. Understanding that power in all its 
ramifications should be a central goal of visual scholarship. Our pursuit of 
that goal is impeded by faulty analogies between images and words, and 
by inappropriate assumptions regarding visual literacy. 
What are the educational implications of this conclusion? Does all this 
mean chat educators can safely ignore this aspect of visual literacy-as 
opposed to the kind of cultural education about images that Erwin 
Panofsky was concerned with? Quite the contrary. The conclusion that we 
have arrived at contains a paradox: Precisely because the basic language 
of visual communication can be so transparent, learning to deal critically 
with that language may actually be more of a challenge than the critical 
parsing of verbal texts. For example, a low camera angle that tries to 
make a politician appear powerful may "fly under the radar" of citizens' 
perceptions more effectively than the verbal proclamation, "Candidate X 
is a strong leader." As an attempt to discourage the uncritical acceptance 
of such visual devices, education in visual literacy may be very valuable 
indeed. 
In other words. if a major goal of education is to encourage learners 
to think for themselves, the main focus of visual education should not be 
on acquiring the grammar of images as such. Young people already have 
an intuitive understanding of that grammar. Instead, the central task 
should be to foster a conscious and critical awareness of the grammar, 
even when it may appear so simple as to be self-evident. This point 
deserves some emphasis. Anyone who has taught visual communication 
is familiar with the fact that the most powerful means of manipulating 
viewers are also. very often. the simplest-and that, in consequence. stu· 
dents often have very little appreciation of that power unless it is deliber­
ately brought to their attention. Consider the visual principle of "false con­
tinuity," which is one of the most fundamental premises of the illusionis­
tic power of film and television. Essentially, it is the basic principle behind 
most narrative editing: two shots joined together in the context of a 
broader narrative are "read" by the viewer as being part of a coherent 
stream of space, time, and action-even if the shots were in fact taken at 
widely separate times and places or if the actions within them were com­
pletely unrelated in real life (Deren. 2005). This principle is equally a part 
of fictional and nonfictional narratives, but it is the nonfictional case in 
particular that raises troublesome questions of visual manipulation and 
the need for critical viewing. 
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In its most extreme form, this principle may be observed in operation 
in those situations in which shots of nonfictional events are assembled 
after the f�ct for inclusion in a documentary, newscast, interview pro­
gram, and so on. A notable example of the kind of misrepresentation that 
such a situation can lead to occurred in a July 2007 BBC report of an 
encounter between England's Queen Elizabeth and Annie Leibovitz. a U.S. 
portrait photographer. In preparation for a photographic session, 
Leibovitz reportedly asked the queen to remove her tiara, a suggestion 
that was apparently received with some initial asperity but that did not 
cause any major problems. However, in an edited tape of the event. the 
interaction with Leibovitz was followed by a shot of the queen expressing 
considerable displeasure-an incident that had actually occurred earlier. 
in reaction not to Leibovitz but to the heavy cape that the queen was 
wearing before the shoot. The BBC itself caught this error, and openly 
acknowledged its significance as a demonstration of the potentially mis­
leading uses of editing. 
Such scruples are less evident in other realms of image making, such 
as political advertising. It is a common procedure in political ads to por­
tray the candidate addressing an audience of admiring representatives of 
the public. The intention, of course, is to convey an image of spontaneous 
approbation of the candidate's remarks. Often, however. the conjunction 
of candidate and responding public may be more of a product of editing 
than of the real-life encounter between the two. For example, in more 
than one ad used during the 2007-2008 election cycle in the United 
States, a rousing speech by a candidate is intercut with shoes of a wildly 
enthusiastic audience-but, when one examines these images carefully. it 
becomes clear that the candidate is actually delivering his or her speech 
to a much smaller group of people than the large, cheering crowd that 
appears in the reaction shots. 
Judging from own experience with students, misleading uses of such 
editing juxtapositions are very hard to detect on first viewing. The tenden­
cy co succumb to the illusion of false continuity is evidently very strong. 
Unfortunately, there is no systematic research that I am aware of regard­
ing viewers' responses to this type of editing device, although the infor. 
ma! experiments described by Lev Kuleshov (1974) and ocher early Soviet 
filmmakers are certainly very instructive. Nevertheless. I strongly suspect 
that, as far as critical viewing is concerned, this aspect of visual manipula­
tion may pose formidable challenges even to the literate viewer. And yet. 
the editing device itself is exceedingly simple: two shots joined together in 
the absence of an actual spatial or temporal connection between their 
contents. If our goal was to reach students to understand the intended 
meaning of the juxtaposition, or even to create such a sequence for them­
selves, the lesson would be over very soon. Bue developing the habits of 
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mind that enable people to spot such misleading juxtapositions when they 
are used by others is a more gradual undertaking. The need for that kind 
of visual literacy is the ultimate conclusion of the arguments developed in 
this chapter. 
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